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Introduction
Never a dull moment, is quite an understatement when
looking back on 2018. While parts of Europe flourish
due to economic growth, leaving the recession far
behind, other parts of Europe are facing economic chal-
lenges and, with it, labour market issues. Italy, for
example, is struggling with the EU when it comes to
controlling its national budget and introducing labour
market reforms, especially to combat youth unemploy-
ment. There seems to be a growing tension between the
‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ not only between countries
but also within them. This spells polarization.
This polarization is strongly embodied by the (original-
ly) French ‘yellow vests movement’. Among other
things, like environment and migration, one of the key
demands of this movement is a ‘fair income’. Wasn’t fair
income one of the ILO-principles? Even though the yel-
low vests movement is connected to France, all across
Europe similar movements are visible. But it seems fair
to say that no country was (and still is) more polarized
than Great Britain due to the Brexit debate. While time
is running out and the no-deal-scenario is still firmly on
the table, leaving the EU has a great impact both within
Britain and on the mainland. Companies are relocating
their headquarters to stay, or deliberately not to stay,
within the scope of the fundamental freedoms of
Europe.
With these stormy winds blowing across Europe, one
might forget that the ECJ once again ruled on some
landmark cases. In Matzak, for example, the Court
decided that the time spent at home but still being avail-
able to the employer qualifies as ‘working time’ (see
Kerr’s contribution). In Egenberger the Court had to
resolve a dispute between two private parties in finding
the balance between religious freedom and non-
discrimination. More specifically, it also considered
whether the Directive allows a church or religious
organisation authoritatively to determine (i.e. without
substantive judicial scrutiny) whether religious affilia-
tion constitutes a genuine occupational requirement.
The Court decided that where a church or religious
body asserts, because of its ethos, that religious belief
constitutes a genuine occupational requirement for
employment, it must at least be possible for such an
assertion to be the subject, if need be, of effective judi-
cial review (EELC’s next issue will contain a detailed
discussion about this judgment).
But maybe the most debated judgments of the ECJ in
2018 are the November rulings on ‘paid leave’.
Although the consequences of registration and the role
of the employer to promote paid leave in the light of
time limitations, as stressed in Max Planck and Conley
King, will have a great impact in daily practice, it is the
proclaimed ‘direct horizontal application’ of (parts of)
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Bauer-case)
that attracted the greatest attention to the Court’s judg-
ments in 2018 (see Vos&Ratti hereafter)! National
judges need to disregard provisions that are contrary to,
in this case, Article 31(2) CFREU. Of course the ques-
tion is to what extent the Bauer judgment applies to oth-
er ‘fundamental social rights’ in the Charter and what
the consequences are or should be regarding the non-
horizontality of directives dealing with social rights that
are covered in the Charter.
The rulings highlighted here, together with the political
debates, are but a few of the interesting developments of
2018. This EELC review elaborates and analyses the
different rulings of the ECJ and national courts. After
reading all the contributions, there is only one way to
answer the following question: Europe in 2018, a dull
moment? Never! And what does that have to say about
2019…? We’ll keep you posted in EELC!
Prof. C. (Catherine) Barnard and prof. A.R. (Ruben)
Houweling
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Age & disability discrimination
Prof. Filip Dorssemont1
Age
The Framework Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a
general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation prohibits discrimination based upon age
in the field of employment and occupation.
The ECJ case Fries (C-190/16) needs to be highlighted,
since it deals with the fundamental rights underlying the
Framework Directive, id est the principle of non-
discrimination based upon age (Article 21 CFREU) and
the right to engage in work (Article 15 CFREU). These
provisions were mobilized within the framework of a
preliminary procedure against an instrument of EU sec-
ondary law (Regulation No. 1178/2011) severely
restricting the legal capacity of licensed pilots to operate
commercial air transport when aged over 60, especially
when aged 65. As a result of this Regulation, the con-
tract of Fries was terminated by Lufthansa. The attempt
of Fries to declare this provision of EU law imposing an
age limit contrary to these Charter provisions in what is
a horizontal conflict between Lufthansa and one of its
pilots was considered to be ill-founded. The ECJ, refer-
ring to Article 52 CFREU, considered that there was a
legitimate aim to restrict the principle of non-
discrimination (security) and that the proportionality
principle was not violated. Hence, the leeway to restrict
the principle of discrimination under Article 21 is sig-
nificantly larger than the leeway to justify
discrimination under EU Directive 2000/78, especially
if one considers the potential spill over of this judgment
in relation to other grounds.
In Stollwitzer (C-482/16) a piece of Austrian legislation
regarding the pay scales applicable to the Austrian rail-
ways (OBB) was alleged to be contrary to the principle
of age discrimination. The legislative intervention
sought to correct the previous position of the article that
working experience commenced prior to the age of
18 years old was not taken into account at all for the
purpose of calculating the pay scales. After the amend-
ment, Stollwitzer’s juvenile working experience contin-
ued to be disregarded based upon the consideration that
it related to another branch of industry than the rail-
ways. The ECJ considered that the Austrian law did not
constitute either direct or indirect discrimination.
Disability
The Framework Directive 2000/78 establishing a gen-
eral framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation prohibits discrimination based upon disabili-
ty in the field of employment and occupation.
In Bedi (C-312/17), the ECJ had to dwell both on the
notion of employment and occupation as defined in the
Directive. Furthermore, it had to assess whether a
regime which allowed for a differentiation of the pay-
1. Filip Dorssemont is a Professor of Labour Law at the Université catholi-
que de Louvain.
ment of bridging assistance depending on the disability
of the worker had to be considered as discriminatory
and could be justified at all. Under the applicable Ger-
man rules, severely disabled persons active in the milita-
ry service in Germany had access to (automatic) early
retirement at an earlier age. As a result of this situation,
the financial situation of these persons was less advanta-
geous than those who could not yet retire, but were
receiving these bridging assistance payments, e.g. in
combination with wages resulting from another job out-
side the armed forces.
The Court ruled that the issue of bridging assistance
payments based upon a collective agreement did not fall
outside the sphere of employment and occupation,
despite the exclusion of social security. It also ruled that
the situation did constitute discrimination based upon
disability.
On 20 February 2018, the (appellate) Labour Court of
Brussels ruled that the dismissal of an employee diag-
nosed with lymph node cancer constituted
discrimination based upon disability (EELC 2018/23).
The disease had generated a situation which entailed
limitations resulting in particular from long term physi-
cal, mental or psychological impairments which, in
interaction with various barriers, hindered the full and
effective participation of the person concerned in
professional life on equal basis with other workers. In
casu, the employer had never considered adapting the
employee’s job, thus violating the duty of reasonable
accommodation. This duty is not absolute. Thus, the
Irish Court of Appeal has ruled in a judgment of 31 Jan-
uary 2018 (EELC 2018/12) that the refusal to provide
another job to a person paralyzed after an accident from
the waist down and requiring a wheelchair was not dis-
criminatory, in so far as that person was not able any-
more to perform any of their previous tasks essential to
their position as ‘special needs assistant’.
Free movement
Prof. Jean-Philippe Lhernould2
Posting remains the most sensitive subject in conjunc-
tion with risks of fraud and social dumping. A series of
cases help clarify the applicable rules. The Altun case
(C-359/16) admits, for the first time, that a national
court may, in the context of proceedings brought against
persons suspected of having used posted workers osten-
sibly covered by A1 certificates, disregard those certifi-
cates if, on the basis of evidence and with due regard to
the safeguards inherent in the right to a fair trial which
must be granted to those persons, it finds the existence
of such fraud. This case should not be misinterpreted:
conditions set by the Court of Justice are so strict that it
is only in exceptional cases that A1 certificates can be
ignored by national Courts. In Alpenrind (C-527/16),
the ECJ indeed reinforces the binding effect attached to
2. Jean-Philippe Lhernould is Professor of Law at Université de Poitiers.
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an A1 certificate. It may even be binding, if appropriate
with retroactive effect, even though that certificate was
issued only after the receiving Member State deter-
mined that the worker concerned was subject to com-
pulsory insurance under its legislation. Unsurprisingly,
in line with this case law, the ECJ subsequently consid-
ered that Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations
under Regulation No. 883/2004 by entitling the compe-
tent national authorities to require, unilaterally and
without following the dialogue and conciliation proce-
dure set out in the Regulation, that the national legisla-
tion on social security matters is to apply to posted
workers who are already subject to a social security
scheme in the Member State in which their employer
normally carries out its activities, on the grounds that
the issuing by the social security body of that Member
State of a document showing that such workers are sub-
ject to the social security scheme of that Member State
(‘A1 certificate’) is an abuse of rights (Commission – v –
Belgium, C-356/15).
The risk of fraudulent posting was in the background
of three more cases. In the first one (Alpenrind), the ECJ
held that if a worker who is posted by his employer to
carry out work in another Member State is replaced by
another worker posted by another employer, the latter
employee must be regarded as being ‘sent to replace
another person’, within the meaning of Article 12(1) of
Regulation 883/2004, so that he cannot benefit from the
special rules laid down in that provision in order to
remain subject to the legislation of the Member State in
which his employer normally carries out its activities. In
other words, a posted worker cannot be immediately
replaced by another posted worker from a different
company without breaching the ‘non-replacement’ rule
set out in Article 12(1) of Regulation 883/2004. This
ruling is clearly influenced by the principle of equality
of treatment (of remuneration) between workers per-
forming their activity at the same place, against the
principle of free movement of services which the Advo-
cate-General promoted in its opinion. This being said,
as the second case indicates, the ECJ remains vigilant
vis-à-vis national rules designed to combat illegal post-
ing rules. In Čepelnik (C-33/17), the Court decided that
Article 56 TFEU precludes legislation of a Member
State under which the competent authorities can order a
commissioning party established in that Member State
to suspend payments to their contractor established in
another Member State, or even to pay a security in an
amount equivalent to the price still owed for the works
in order to guarantee payment of the fine which might
be imposed on that contractor in the event of a proven
infringement of the labour law of the first Member
State. This case is a reminder for all Member States
which keep increasing administrative, civil and criminal
sanctions to tackle illegal posting, losing sight of the fact
that national measures which are liable to restrict or to
make less attractive the exercise of the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU may be permitted
only where they serve overriding reasons in the public
interest, are appropriate for attaining their objective,
and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain that
objective. A last posting case gave the ECJ the opportu-
nity to rule that an employee recruited with a view to
being posted to another Member State must be regarded
as having been ‘just before the start of his employment
… already subject to the legislation of the Member State
in which his employer is established’ even if that
employee was not an insured person under the legisla-
tion of that Member State immediately before the start
of his employment, if, at that time, that employee had
his residence in that Member State (Walltopia,
C-451/17). This case, which consolidates the content of
the practical guide issued by the Commission, facilitates
posting operations while at the same time avoiding the
absence of social security legislation applicable to non-
active mobile persons. One important question remains
though: How long should a person be subject to a cer-
tain legislation before posting is allowed? Should the
one-month period set out in an administrative decision
be compatible with rules on free movement of services?
Concerning the determination of the social security
law applicable to migrant workers, the ECJ clarified
specific situations where a person carries out an activity
in two Member States. It held that a person residing
and employed in the territory of one Member State
who, for a period of three months, takes unpaid leave
and is employed in the territory of another Member
State, is to be regarded as normally employed in the ter-
ritory of two Member States within the meaning of that
provision, provided that, during that period of leave, he
is considered as normally employed under the social
security legislation of the first Member State and that
the activity carried out in the territory of the second
Member State is habitual and significant in nature (X,
C-569/15). On the same day, the Court held that a per-
son who is employed by an employer established in the
territory of one Member State and who resides in
another Member State where he carried out, over the
course of the past year, a part of his employment activity
amounting to 6.5% of his hours worked without such an
arrangement having been agreed with his employer in
advance, is not to be considered to be normally
employed in the territory of two Member States (X,
C-570/15). Even though these two cases are connected
with the former Regulation 1408/71, they remain rele-
vant under Regulation 883/2004 which provides that a
person who normally pursues an activity as an employed
person in two or more Member States is subject to the
legislation of the Member State of residence if he/she
pursues a ‘substantial part’ of his/her activity in that
Member State. It is necessary to derogate from the gen-
eral rule of connection to the Member State of employ-
ment only in specific situations which demonstrate that
another connection is more appropriate.
Contrary to other social security benefits, the exporta-
tion of unemployment benefits in other countries is
limited in time. Entitlement is retained for only three
months, but the competent institutions may extend the
period up to a maximum of six months. How should the
extension rule be understood? While recalling that that
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provision does not require the competent institutions to
extend up to a maximum of six months, the ECJ draws a
clear line between two types of countries, those which
have not activated the extension option and those
which have done so. In this last case, it is required that
countries must adopt national measures regulating the
competent institution’s discretion, in particular by spec-
ifying the conditions on which extension of the unem-
ployment benefit export period beyond three months is
or is not to be granted (Schiphorst, C-551/16). The cur-
rent discussion of the revision of Regulation 883/2004
could lead to the extension of the exportation to a six-
month minimum period, but the competent services or
institutions may extend that period up to ‘the end of the
period of entitlement to benefits’. The solution adopted
in Schiphorst would be transposable to this new exten-
sion.
A quite interesting question derives from the right to
retain the status of worker under Directive 2004/38:
Should a Union citizen who is no longer a self-
employed person retain this status for the reason that,
according to Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC,
he has ‘duly recorded involuntary unemployment’. The
answer given is positive (Gusa, C-442/16). This state
indeed covers self-employed workers who ceased their
activity because of absence of work owing to reasons
beyond their control. This far-reaching interpretation of
the Directive, which is motivated by the will to
strengthen the fundamental right of all Union citizens to
move and reside freely without making differences
between employed and self-employed workers, is dar-
ing. In our view, a similar solution could have been
reached more simply by applying Article 56 TFEU
(compare with Commission – v – Luxembourg,
C-111/91).
A last case about access to reliance on care-related
benefit by a cross-border student deserves attention
since it comes back to the complex matter of the coordi-
nation between Union citizens’ treaty principles and
social security coordination rules. The Court held that
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU preclude the home municipal-
ity of a resident of a Member State who is severely disa-
bled from refusing to grant that person a benefit, such as
personal assistance, on the ground that he is staying in
another Member State in order to pursue his higher
education studies there (A, C-679/16). This case
implicitly means that a mobile disabled person gets
more rights, thanks to his Union citizen status, when
the reliance on care-related benefit falls outside of the
scope of Regulation 883/2004 (compare with Von
Chamier, C-208/07).
Fixed-term work and part-time
work
Francesca Maffei3
The number of the ECJ’s rulings concerning the consis-
tency of national legislation on ‘flexible’ employment
contracts with European law has increased proportional-
ly to the increasing use of these contracts by employers.
Besides, the exigency to balance the employer’s demand
for flexibility with the employees’ need for security has
been always a goal of European legislation, as shown in
the Council Directives concerning fixed-term and part-
time work, to which this review is dedicated.
Fixed-Term Work
As far as what are referred to as fixed-term contracts,
Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 con-
cerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work
reached by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, confirms that
open-ended employment contracts must be in the gen-
eral form of employment relationships. According to
this general rule, the Directive and its annex envisages
general principles and minimum requirements to be
included in the rules governing fixed-term employment
relationships.
In particular, scholars recognise that the Directive has a
two-fold objective:
– to ensure compliance with the principle of non-
discrimination against workers employed under
fixed-term contracts; and
– to prevent abuse arising from the use of suc-
cessive fixed-term working relationships.
In spite of the clarity concerning its purposes, the
Council Directive on fixed-term work has led to an
unusually high amount of litigation on its core issues:
anti-discrimination, age discrimination, prevention of
abuse of fixed-term contracts and conversion of fixed-
term contracts into open-ended contracts. The reason is
probably found in the wide freedom the Member States
have to implement the rules concerning fixed-term con-
tracts, leaving the ECJ to verify, case-by-case, if such
legislation is consistent with European law. This situa-
tion provides enormous scope for the ECJ to act as an
agent in setting trends in the labour market.
An analysis of recent ECJ judgments concerning the
consistency of national legislation with different key
clauses of the Council Directive on fixed-term contracts
(ruled in 2017-2018 and where fixed-term work is the
main ground for the litigation and not a merely marginal
issue) produces numerous interesting findings. It seems,
indeed, that equal treatment is the most weighty issue
governing the formulation of ECJ judgments on fixed-
term work, followed by some statements concerning the
degree of (ir)rationality in stipulating successive fixed-
term contracts.
3. Francesca Maffei is a Phd in comparative law and integration process,
Università degli studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli.
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The following lines will be dedicated to a review of
these recent EJC decisions. In detail, the first section
includes all the rulings regarding the possible breach of
clause 4 of the Framework Agreement annexed to the
Council Directive (introducing the principle of equal
treatment), while in the second section the report con-
tains all the claims in which the ECJ, in accordance with
clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to the
Council Directive, verified the legitimacy of different
national measures to prevent the successive use of fixed-
term contracts.
• Principle of Equal Treatment (clause 4)
The principle of equal treatment (with regard to compa-
rable workers on contracts for indefinite periods of
time), as stated in clause 4 of the Framework Agreement
annexed to Council Directive 1999/70, implies (for
fixed-term workers) equal payment, equal access to
training, and the prospect of obtaining an open-ended
contract if the employment relationship continues
beyond the previously agreed fixed period of time.
The list of all the rights included in the concept of the
‘employment conditions’ (provided for in clause 4) of
permanent workers which have to be assured also to
fixed-term workers is always increasing thanks to the
ECJ’s decisions.
Differential treatment may, however, be justified on
‘objective’ grounds. The following report shows that
recently the ECJ emphasised these objective grounds to
justify different treatment provided for in national legis-
lation between fixed-term and permanent workers. The
result is a trend of ‘minimisation’ of the equal treatment
principle, especially for what concerns the public sector,
in which the superior interest of impartiality is often
considered as a strong legal basis for different treatment.
For example, in the case Motter (C-466/17), the ECJ
upheld the legitimacy of national legislation concerning
the public sector (one provided for in a special Italian
District called Provincia Autonoma di Trento, which is
characterised by a wide legislative autonomy from the
central Italian Government) which provided a totally
different mechanism to calculate the length of service of
a supply teacher hired by fixed-term contract and a per-
manent teacher, in order to decide the salary grade.
This law was considered not in breach of clause 4(1) of
the Framework Agreement because the difference in
treatment was justified by the existence of an objective
reason, which was not to discriminate against civil serv-
ants. Indeed, in Italy, in the public sector, permanent
civil servants are recruited by competition (while supply
teachers are hired by fixed-term contracts, so without
competition), teach just one subject (while fixed-term
workers teach a lot of subjects, so probably their
professional skills could be considered as inferior to
those of a civil servant) and work on a working time cal-
culated in a different way. According to the ECJ, all
these objective differences justify the different ‘treat-
ment’ in calculating the length of service. Similarly, in
Grupo Norte (C-574/16), different treatment between
fixed-term and permanent workers was not considered
as discriminatory as there were objective grounds.
Under Spanish legislation, the termination of an
employment contract on any of the objective grounds
set out in the law confers entitlement on the worker to
payment of a certain compensation equivalent to twenty
days’ remuneration per year of service. On the contrary,
in case of termination of certain types of fixed-term con-
tracts, on expiry of the term, the law provides for a
smaller compensation.
According to the ECJ, this difference in compensation is
not discriminatory, as the two different types of com-
pensation for termination meet different objectives (the
compensation for certain fixed-term workers aims to
prevent excessive use of temporary employment while
compensation in case of termination for objective
reasons is meant to compensate for the fact that a work-
er’s legitimate expectation that the employment rela-
tionship would continue has been frustrated). Addition-
ally, in Mateos (C-677/16), the Court upheld the legiti-
macy of Spanish legislation which, in contrast to what is
established for permanent workers, doesn’t grant any
compensation to fixed-term workers at the end of the
employment contract (according to the Court, the dif-
ference is not discriminatory as the end of a fixed-term
contract is foreseeable from the start, whereas the main
objective of compensation for objective reasons, which
generally applies to permanent workers, is to recom-
pense them for the fact that termination of the contract
is not knowable in advance).
In some situations, different treatment is allowed
because there is a comparable ‘right’ for fixed-term
workers. For example, in Viejobuena Ibáñez, C-245/17,
the Court upheld the legitimacy of national legislation
which provided for termination of fixed-term contracts
for teachers recruited for one academic year as interim
civil servants at the end of the teaching period, even if
this deprived those teachers of the days of paid annual
leave for that academic year (while permanent teachers
always have days of paid annual leave), provided that
such teachers received a specific allowance on that
account.
This restrictive trend in applying the principle of equal-
ity is tempered by some other important rulings in
which, on the contrary, the difference in treatment pro-
vided for in national legislation has been considered in
breach of clause 4 of the Framework Agreement.
For example, in Vega Gonzàlez, C-158/16, the ECJ
firstly held that the meaning of the concept of ‘employ-
ment conditions’ referred to in clause 4 includes the
right for a worker, who has been elected to a parliamen-
tary role, to benefit from special service leave provided
for under national legislation (namely, under which the
employment relationship is suspended until the end of
that parliamentary term of office). Secondly, the ECJ
stated that is not valid for national legislation to pre-
clude a fixed-term worker from the special leave pro-
vided for permanent workers in a case where they may
hold political office.
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• Measures to prevent abuse from the use of successive
fixed-term employment contracts (clause 5)
As already stated, the second purpose of the Directive is
to prevent the use of successive fixed-term contracts or
relationships (clause 1). While the principle is generally
fixed, the Framework Agreement (clause 5) assures to
the Member States freedom to choose what kind of
measure they consider best to prevent abuse from the
use of successive fixed-term employment contracts.
According to clause 5 of the Agreement, Member States
can also adopt more than one measure and differentiate
one from another depending on the sector and category
of workers. What is important is that measures are pro-
portionate, dissuasive and effective. The Court is nor-
mally asked to rule on the assessment of these measures
(in terms of proportionality, dissuasiveness and effec-
tiveness).
For example, in Santoro (C-494/16), the claim con-
cerned Italian legislation in which the measures to pre-
vent abuse in fixed-term contracts for the employees of
public authorities and those working in the private sec-
tor are totally different. In effect, whereas a chain of
fixed employment contracts in the private sector can be
converted into an indefinite contract, this is not possible
in the public sector. Also, in the private sector, employ-
ees can claim higher compensation (up to 14 times the
last month’s salary).
The differences also concern other aspects: for example,
the managers of the public sector are liable for breaches
of the rules on fixed contracts and, compared to the pri-
vate sector, the chances of public sector workers obtain-
ing compensation is smaller. Nevertheless, in the ruling
mentioned above, the ECJ decided that such legislation
was not in breach of clause 5 of the Framework Agree-
ment as it was accompanied by an effective and dissua-
sive penalty mechanism for public workers (i.e. com-
pensation of between 2.5 and 12 times the last monthly
salary of those workers together with the possibility for
them to obtain full compensation for the harm suffered
by demonstrating, by way of presumption, the loss of
opportunities to find employment or that, if a recruit-
ment competition had been duly organised, they would
have been successful).
On the contrary, in Sciotto, C-331/17, even though the
case concerned the same Italian legislation, the ECJ
decided in a totally different manner. In this case the
claim concerned a ballet dancer at the Fondazione Teatro
dell’Opera di Roma who worked under several fixed-
term employment contracts so that she claimed that she
had been a permanent staff member and sought a decla-
ration that her employment contract had converted into
one for an indefinite period. The National Court of
Appeal dismissed her claim as the regulations containing
limitations to fixed-term contracts did not apply to
operatic and orchestral foundations but wondered
whether this complied with EU law and asked a prelimi-
nary question to the ECJ. The decision of the ECJ was
to consider this legislation in breach of EU law, not
because the measures in preventing abuse in this sector
are different to the ones in the private sector but
because there is no other effective measure in the
domestic legal system penalising abuses identified in the
sector of operatic and orchestral foundations.
Part-time work
As far as part-time contracts are concerned, the analysis
of two recent ECJ’s rulings show that the European
Court is very strict in ensuring compliance of national
legislation on this matter with the European principle of
equal treatment between part-time and full-time work-
ers. This is justified by the fact that often differences in
treatment of part-time workers result in discrimination
between men and women.
For example, in Espadas Recio (C-98/15) the Court,
while recognising that statutory social security pension
is a field not regulated by the European Framework
Agreement on part-time work, held that a Spanish pro-
vision concerning unemployment benefits was illegiti-
mate. This provision excluded days not worked from
the calculation of days in respect of which contributions
have been paid, and therefore reduced the unemploy-
ment benefit payment period for vertical part-time
workers. In this case, Spanish law was not considered in
breach of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement
(which does not apply to contributory unemployment
benefit)4 but in breach of Article 4(1) of Council Direc-
tive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of
the principle of equal treatment for men and women,
because the majority of vertical part-time workers are
women. According to the Court, women were adversely
affected by such legislation and this is a kind of
discrimination not allowed under European law. Article
3 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC says that statutory
schemes providing protection against unemployment
fall within the scope of the Directive and Article 4(1)
forbids both direct and indirect discrimination on the
ground of sex, in particular as regards the scope of
schemes and conditions of access, the obligation to con-
tribute and the calculation of benefits.
In closing this brief report, it is symbolic to make refer-
ence to another recent ECJ ruling in which the ECJ,
with reference to a case involving Council Directive
97/81/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on
part-time work, affirmed the central and essential role of
European law. Indeed in O’Brien (C-432/17), the Court
decided that the mechanism (for calculating the retire-
ment pension entitlement) introduced by this Directive
apply also to periods of service prior to the deadline for
transposing the Directive (if the accrual of pension takes
place both before and after the transposition deadline).
Concluding remarks
The rulings mentioned above show that, in recent years,
the ECJ has always had a crucial role in identifying the
4. Clause 4 (1) and (2) of Directive 97/81/EC containing the Framework
Agreement on part-time work says that, in respect of employment con-
ditions, part-time workers shall not be treated less favourably than com-
parable full-time workers solely because they work part-time unless dif-
ferent treatment is justified on objective grounds and that, where
appropriate, the principle of pro rata temporis shall apply.
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employment conditions that should be equally recog-
nised and applied to every kind of worker (even part-
time or fixed-term workers) and in strengthening the
remedies against discrimination (in the technical sense).
But it also seems that, if this difference in treatment
doesn’t result in discrimination, the Court often argues
for the existence of sufficient objective grounds to allow




The Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/23/EC
continues to raise complicated issues for national courts
as well as for the ECJ. During 2018, however, the ECJ
issued only two judgments regarding this Directive.
Both of them were preliminary rulings requested from
Spain. Whether this indicates that most issues regarding
interpretation of the Directive have been clarified by the
ECJ remains to be seen, but the existing extensive bulk
of jurisprudence might in many cases offer arguments
for national courts to claim that there exist earlier ECJ
jurisprudence for most types of upcoming situations. In
the following I discuss the two judgments given in 2018.
Case C-60/17: Angel Somoza Hermo
In case C-60/17, Angel Somoza Hermo, the ECJ once
again had to discuss the basic problem of the criteria
that constitute an economic entity. The background is
that the Directive is only applicable where there is a
transfer of an economic entity retaining its identity and
the national court wanted clarification on whether a
transfer under the Directive took place in this case. Fur-
thermore the ECJ was asked about the joint and several
liability for obligations which arose before the transfer
and had not been fulfilled.
The facts in the case were very much about the relation-
ship between the Directive, Spanish law and a collective
agreement in force regulating the employment relation-
ships of security guards. Article 14 of the Spanish Col-
lective State Agreement for Security Firms provides
that a new acquirer of a contract for security services
must take over the contracts of the employees assigned
to that contract and workplace, if they have been
assigned to it for at least seven months.
First the Collective Agreement defined the situation as a
transfer within the meaning of the word under the
Directive and Spanish law. The first question asked by
the Spanish Court was whether Article 1(1) of the
Directive must also be interpreted so that the Directive
is applicable.
Second under the Directive there is an option to intro-
duce joint and several liability. Under Article 3 of the
Directive “Member States may provide that after the
5. Niklas Bruun is currently professor in Hanken School of Economics
(Helsinki) and guest professor at Stockholm University.
date of the transfer, the transferor and the transferee
shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of obliga-
tions which arose before the date of transfer from a con-
tract of employment or an employment relationship
existing on the date of the transfer”. It is also clear from
Article 8 of the Directive that collective agreements
more favourable to the employees are permitted on
national level.
In this case, however, the Spanish legislation (the Span-
ish Workers’ Statute Article 44(3)) stipulates that a
transferor and transferee are in principle jointly and sev-
erally liable for pre-transfer obligations of the transferor
for a period of three years. Contrary to this Article 14 of
the Spanish Collective State Agreement for Security
Firms stipulates that the new acquirer is not liable for
payments and fees payable for work prior to the date on
which the contract was taken over.
The ECJ had no problem in answering the first question
in this case. One reason was that both the Directive and
the Collective Agreement pointed in the same direction
and indicated that the transaction was a transfer. The
Court underlined that under the Directive the type of
business at stake must be taken into account when
assessing whether a transfer has taken place. In labour-
intense sectors, such as in the case at hand, a group of
workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis
may constitute an economic activity especially if the new
employer takes over a major part of employees specially
assigned by the transferor to that task, in terms of num-
ber and skills. According to the Court the objective pur-
sued by the Collective Agreement was the same as that
pursued by the Directive and the Directive was applica-
ble.
The second question was more complicated from the
point of view of EU law. Here the Directive gives the
option to the Member States to introduce joint liability
for the transferor and the transferee. This option had
been used by Spain, but in this case the Collective
Agreement had derogated from the Spanish legislation.
The ECJ quite correctly observed that the Directive as
such tolerates different solutions regarding joint and
several liability and that in this case the question at stake
concerned the relationship between Spanish law and
Spanish collective agreements which fell outside of the
ECJ’s competence.
Case C-472/16: Jorge Luís Colino Sigüenza
• Facts
The facts of the case related to Mr Colino Sigüenza who
had been employed as a music teacher at the Municipal
Music School of Valladolid (Spain) from 1996. Origi-
nally, that music school was directly managed by the
municipal administration of Valladolid and Mr Colino
Sigüenza was initially employed by the administration.
From 1997, the municipal administration of Valladolid
stopped managing the school directly and put out a ser-
ies of calls for tenders for its management. The contrac-
tor designated after those successive procedures was,
without interruption from that time until 31 August
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2013, the private company Músicos y Escuela, which
carried on the business of the music school, managing
the premises, facilities and instruments necessary for the
provision of that service. Músicos y Escuela also took
over some of the workers who had been employed by
the municipal administration, including Mr Colino
Sigüenza. That activity continued to be regarded as a
service offered to citizens by the municipal administra-
tion of Valladolid as the Municipal School of Music.
Due to a reduction in the number of students of the
Valladolid Municipal Academy of Music in the
2012-2013 school year, the sums paid by students for
that service were no longer commensurate with the
amounts to be paid by the municipal administration of
Valladolid under the contract concluded with Músicos y
Escuela, which led the latter to claim from the adminis-
tration the sum of EUR 58 403.73 in respect of the first
term of that school year and EUR 48 592.74 in respect
of the second term .
Since the municipal administration of Valladolid
refused to pay those sums in 2013 Músicos y Escuela
requested the termination of the service contract on the
ground of the administration’s non-performance and
claimed corresponding damages. In response, in August
2013, the municipal administration terminated the con-
tract, alleging wrongful conduct by Músicos y Escuela
as it had ceased its activities before the contractual end-
date. The case was brought before a local court in Spain
which by a number of final judgments delivered during
2014 and 2015 decided, firstly, that the municipal
administration of Valladolid had breached the contract
concluded with Músicos y Escuela, in so far as it pro-
vided for a guaranteed income irrespective of the num-
ber of students enrolled and that, by failing to comply
therewith, the municipal administration had itself pre-
vented Músicos y Escuela from continuing its activities,
thus justifying the termination of that contract on the
grounds of the wrongful conduct of the municipal
administration. Secondly, since Músicos y Escuela had
not fulfilled its obligations by having decided unilateral-
ly to cease its activities on 31 March 2013, the damages
which it sought were refused.
In the meantime, in August 2013, the municipal admin-
istration of Valladolid assigned the management of the
Municipal Music School to another company In-pulso
Musical and gave it, as it had done with Músicos y
Escuela, the use of the premises, instruments and equip-
ment necessary to that end. In-pulso Musical started its
activities in September 2013 for the 2013-2014 school
year. Following a new tendering procedure, the contract
to In-pulso Musical was also awarded for the 2014-2015
and 2015-2016 academic years. That company did not
hire any of the employees who previously worked in the
Municipal School of Music and who were collectively
dismissed by Músicos y Escuela.
• Questions referred to the ECJ
Mr Colino Sigüenza raised a case against Músicos y
Escuela, the municipal administration of Valladolid and
In-pulso Musical to challenge his dismissal. In that case
it was argued that In-pulso Musical had succeeded
Músicos y Escuela as Mr Colino Sigüenza’s employer.
The court did not accept this, since nearly five months
had elapsed between the dismissal and In-pulso Musi-
cal’s taking over the management of the Municipal
School of Music.
Mr Colino Sigüenza appealed against that decision
before the referring court, the Tribunal Superior de
Justicia de Castilla y León (High Court of Justice of
Castile-Leon). He claimed among other things that
there had been, in the present case, a transfer of under-
taking to In-pulso Musical, so that operation cannot jus-
tify the termination of his employment contract since
there was no valid reason for the termination.
In those circumstances, the Tribunal Superior decided
to stay the proceedings and refer three questions to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling:
1. Should it be considered that there is a transfer for
the purposes of Directive 2001/23/EC where the
holder of a concession of a Municipal Music School,
which receives all the material resources from that
Municipality (premises, instruments, classrooms,
furniture), has engaged its own staff and provides its
services during the academic year, ceases that activi-
ty on 1 April 2013, two months before the end of
the academic year, returning all the material resour-
ces to the Council, which does not resume the activ-
ity for the remainder of the academic year 2012/13,
but awards a new concession to a new contractor,
which resumes the activity in September 2013?
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirma-
tive, is it to be understood for the purposes of Arti-
cle 4(1) of the Directive that, in the circumstances
described – in which the failure of the main under-
taking (the Municipality) to fulfil its obligations
obliges the first contractor to cease its activity and to
dismiss all its staff and immediately afterwards that
main undertaking transfers the material resources to
a second contractor, which continues with the same
activity – the dismissal of the first contractor’s
employees has occurred for ‘economic, technical or
organisational reasons entailing changes in the
workforce’ or has it been caused by ‘the transfer of
the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking
or business’, a cause prohibited by that Article?
The third question was related to processual issues
relating to the res judicata principle and Article 47 of the
EU Charter. The ECJ declared the third question inad-
missible due to lack of information and I will not discuss
it further.
• Argumentation by the ECJ
The ECJ started its answer to the first question by
recalling that the aim of Directive 2001/23 is to ensure
continuity of employment relationships within an eco-
nomic entity, irrespective of any change of ownership.
The decisive criterion for establishing the existence of a
transfer within the meaning of that Directive is, there-
fore, the fact that the entity in question retains its iden-
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tity, as indicated by the fact, inter alia, that its operation
is actually continued or resumed (Ferreira da Silva e
Brito and Others, C-160/14, paragraph 25 and the case-
law cited).
Furthermore, it is clear from the case-law of the Court
that a temporary suspension, of only a few months, of
the undertaking’s activities cannot preclude the possibil-
ity that the economic entity at issue in the main pro-
ceedings retained its identity and that there was there-
fore a transfer of undertaking within the meaning of that
Directive (see, to that effect, Ferreira da Silva e Brito
and Others, C-160/14, paragraph 31).
In that regard, the Court has held, in particular, that the
fact that the undertaking was, at the time of the transfer,
temporarily closed and had no employees in its service is
admittedly one factor to be taken into account when
assessing whether an existing economic entity was trans-
ferred. However, the temporary closure of an undertak-
ing and the resulting absence of staff at the time of the
transfer do not of themselves preclude the possibility
that there has been a transfer of an undertaking within
the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23 (Bork
International and Others, C-101/87, paragraph 16 and
the case-law cited).
That conclusion applies in particular in a situation such
as that at issue in the main proceedings, where, although
the undertaking’s activities ceased for five months, that
period included three months of school holidays.
Consequently, the temporary suspension of the under-
taking’s activities and In-pulso Musical’s failure to take
over Músicos y Escuela’s employees cannot preclude the
possibility that the economic entity at issue in the main
proceedings retained its identity and that there was
therefore a transfer of undertaking within the meaning
of that Directive.
The second question was whether the dismissal of the
employees must be regarded as having been made for
‘economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing
changes in the workforce’ or that the reason for that
dismissal was ‘the transfer of an undertaking, business,
or part of an undertaking or business’.
Here the ECJ recalled that Directive 2001/23 is inten-
ded to safeguard the rights of employees in the event of
a change of employer by allowing them to continue to
work for the new employer on the same conditions as
those agreed with the transferor (Juuri, C-396.07, para-
graph 28 and the case-law cited). The purpose of the
Directive is to ensure, as far as possible, that the con-
tract of employment or employment relationship con-
tinues unchanged with the transferee, in order to pre-
vent the workers concerned from being placed in a less
favourable position solely as a result of the transfer.
That being so, as is clear from the very wording of the
first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/23,
the protection that the Directive is intended to provide
only concerns workers who have an employment con-
tract or employment relationship existing at the date of
the transfer. Furthermore it must be observed that,
under Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/23, the transfer of
an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or
business must not in itself constitute grounds for
dismissal by the transferor or the transferee.
The ECJ noted that Mr Colino Sigüenza’s dismissal
took place well before the date of the transfer of the
activity to In-pulso Musical and that the reason for that
termination of the employment relationship was the fact
that it was impossible for Músicos y Escuela to pay its
staff, a situation resulting from a breach by the munici-
pal administration of Valladolid of the provisions of its
contract with Músicos y Escuela. Thus, those circum-
stances would appear to militate in favour of a classifica-
tion of the dismissal of the staff of Músicos y Escuela for
‘economic, technical or organisational reasons’, within
the meaning of Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/23, pro-
vided, however, that the circumstances which gave rise
to the dismissal of all the staff and the delayed appoint-
ment of a new service provider are not a deliberate
measure intended to deprive the employees concerned
of the rights conferred on them by Directive 2001/23,
which it will be for the referring court to ascertain.
In the light of these considerations, the answer to the
second question is that in circumstances such as those at
issue in the main proceedings, where the successful ten-
derer for a service contract for the management of a
municipal school of music ceases that activity two
months before the end of the current academic year,
proceeding to dismiss the staff, and the new contractor
takes over the activity at the beginning of the next aca-
demic year, it appears that the dismissal of the employ-
ees was made for ‘economic, technical or organisational
reasons entailing changes in the workforce’, within the
meaning of that provision.
• Concluding remarks
In light of the previous case law of the ECJ, to which it
largely referred in its judgment, it was in no way any
surprise that the ECJ found that a transfer of undertak-
ing had taken place in this particular case, although it
can be noted that AG Tanchev came to the opposite
conclusion by underlining that only the material assets
had been taken over, a fact which he regarded as an
indication that the identity had not been retained.
The more interesting part of the judgment relates to the
question whether the reason for the dismissal of Mr
Sigüenza was the transfer or whether it was economic,
technical or organisational reasons which were not rela-
ted to the transfer. From the facts of the case it can be
observed that the transferor Músicos y Escuela’s had
issued a notice of dismissal to all its staff of 23 teachers
and 3 administrative employees with effect from 8 April
2013. On 30 July 2013 Músicos y Escuela’s was declared
insolvent and was later dissolved by court order.
It seems clear that the employment relationships
between Músicos y Escuela’s and its employees had
been terminated when the City Council in the Summer
of 2013 put out a call for tenders for the provision of
services for the management of a musical school. That
again results in a situation where the answer by the ECJ
to the first question of the Spanish court becomes more
or less meaningless: it has no relevance for the previous
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employees of the transferor to know that a transfer
between a company without any employees and the
transferee took place in August/September 2013. In fact
in this case the ECJ could have started by answering the
second question, which would have given sufficient
guidance for the referring court to decide the case.
For future practice the case contains an important mes-
sage. For employees it can be valuable (the opposite
might apply to employers) to try to prolong the period
of continued employment (to take out holidays, or con-
tinue information and consultation procedures) with the
transferor in order to still have a contract of employ-
ment or employment relationship on the date of the
transfer. In such a situation the transferee will have to
transfer those employees to the transferee on the date of




23 November 2018 marked the 25th anniversary of the
adoption by the Council of Directive 93/104/EC con-
cerning aspects of the organisation of working time.
Central to the operation of the Directive (and the subse-
quent codified Directive 2003/88/EC) is the definition
of “working time”, namely “any period during which
the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and
carrying out his [or her] activities and duties, in accord-
ance with national laws and/or practice”. Any period
which is not “working time” is classified as a “rest peri-
od”: see Article 2(1) and (2) of both Directives.
This binary divide between “work” and “rest” contin-
ues to create problems for national courts resulting in
important rulings over the course of 2018 of the Court
of Justice and the EFTA Court concerning the classifi-
cation of “on-call time” and “travelling time”.
The issue of “on-call time” first came before the ECJ in
a reference from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la
Comunidad Valenciana: case C-303/98, Sindicato de
Médicos de Asistencia Pública – v – Conselleria de Sanidad
y Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana.
Here the ECJ drew a distinction between time spent on-
call by doctors where their presence and availability at a
health centre was required and on-call time where doc-
tors were contactable without their having to be at the
health centre. Even though the latter were at their
employer’s disposal, they could “manage their time with
fewer constraints and pursue their own interests”.
Accordingly, such on-call time, unless it was linked to
the actual provision of primary care services, could not
be regarded as “working time”. This distinction
between on-call time spent at and outside the workplace
was reinforced by the ECJ decisions in case C-151/02,
6. Anthony Kerr is a Senior Counsel at the Bar of Ireland and an Associate
Professor at the Sutherland School of Law in University College Dublin.
Landeshauptstadt Kiel – v – Jaeger and case C-14/04,
Dellas – v – Premier Ministre.
The essence of these decisions is that the time during
which a worker is required to be available for his or her
employer is to be classified as “working time” where the
location of the worker is restricted by the employer. In
Germany, this is regarded as “standby duty” which is
seen as qualitatively different to time where workers can
be wherever they like but remain available to the
employer.
The distinction between a duty to be on standby and a
duty to be available was recognised by the CJEU in the
case of Matzak (C-518/15), a reference from the Cour
du Travail de Bruxelles. Here, the claimant was a mem-
ber of the fire service who was required to be available
on call for work, for one week out of every four, during
the evenings and at the weekend. This obliged him to
remain contactable and, if necessary, report to the fire
station as soon as possible and in any event within no
more than eight minutes under normal conditions. Fail-
ure to comply with these requirements could lead to dis-
ciplinary, and possibly penal, sanctions.
The CJEU ruled that the obligation to remain physical-
ly at a place determined by the employer coupled with
the “geographical and temporal constraints” resulting
from the requirement to reach his place of work within
eight minutes were such as to “objectively limit the
opportunities which a worker … has to devote himself
to his personal and social interests”. Accordingly, such
on-call standby time was to be regarded as “working
time”.
At what point does stand-by time become availability
time? According to EELC’s German correspondent,
when commenting on the decision of the Tribunal da
Relação do Porto that availability time was “working
time” (EELC 2018/33), the Bundesarbeitsgericht ruled,
in January 2002, that a requirement to reach one’s place
of employment within 20 minutes rendered such stand-
by time to be working time (6 AZR 214/00).
Ordinarily, the time spent travelling by a worker from
home to his or her place of employment, and back to
home, is not regarded as “working time”. What if the
worker does not have a fixed or habitual place of work?
This issue arose in case C-266/14, Federación de Servi-
cios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras – v – Tyco
Integrated Security SL. Here the company employed
security technicians who had the use of a company vehi-
cle in which they travelled from their homes to the pla-
ces where they were to install or maintain security sys-
tems. The company counted the time spent traveling
between customers as “working time” but not the time
spent travelling between home and the first and last cus-
tomer. The Court ruled that that time was “working
time”. A similar decision was reached by the Arbeidshof
Antwerpen in the case of workers who were part of a
vlinderploeg (butterfly team) for a cleaning company
(EELC 2018/44).
The ambit of the ruling in Tyco,and in particular
whether it only applied to peripatetic workers, was con-
sidered by the EFTA Court in case E-19/16, Thue – v –
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Government of Norway (http:// www. eftacourt. int/
uploads/ tx_ nvcases/ 19_ 16_ Judgment_ EN. pdf). Here,
the claimant was a member of a Special Response Unit
based at a rural police station. His claim concerned
assignments for the unit which involved driving
between his home and the location where he was
instructed to attend. The EFTA Court held that Tyco
was not limited to cases where the worker did not have a
fixed or habitual place of work and stated:
“Any journey to and/or from a location other than the
worker’s fixed or habitual place of attendance shall be
deemed to have begun, and its return to have ended,
either at the worker’s home, or his fixed or habitual place
of work, whichever is the more reasonable in the circum-
stances”.
In considering this, account was to be taken of whether
the journey to and/or from the location of the worker’s
assignment is shorter if travelling from the worker’s
home as opposed to his, or her, fixed or habitual place of
attendance.
When the case returned to the Norges Høyesterett, the
Norwegian Government accepted that the time in ques-
tion was “working time” within the meaning of the
Directive and the Working Environment Act of 2005
(EELC 2018/32).
As Advocate General Sharpston noted in her opinion in
Matzak, the claim was essentially concerned with the
question of pay. Similarly, the EFTA Surveillance
Authority, in its submission in Theu, noted that the
underlying dispute concerned the level of remuneration
to which the claimant was entitled for the disputed jour-
neys. Similar submissions were made by the European
Commission.
In Matzak, the CJEU confirmed that Article 2 of the
Directive does not require the Member States to deter-
mine the remuneration of periods of standby time. The
Member States, however, are free to provide that such
time should be paid for: see the Constantin case from
Romania (EELC 2018/34).
The CJEU was also called upon to clarify the meaning
of Article 5 of the Directive concerning weekly rest
periods: Case C-306/16, Maio Marques Da Rosa. That
Article provides that the Member States shall take the
measures necessary to ensure that, “per each seven-day
period”, every worker is entitled to a minimum uninter-
rupted rest period of 24 hours plus the 11 hours’ daily
rest referred to in Article 3. Did this require the
employer to provide the 24 hour rest period no later
than the day following a period of six consecutive work-
ing days? The Court held that Article 5 required the
Member States to ensure that every worker enjoyed a
minimum uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours but it
did not prescribe when that rest period must be granted.
It followed that the 24-hour period could be provided at
any time within each seven-day period.
Annual leave
Jan-Pieter Vos, Luca Ratti7
Introduction
2018 was a very important year for the right to annual
leave. We saw some very principled ECJ judgments
which are likely to have a long lasting impact. In partic-
ular, the ECJ’s interpretation of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU (CFREU) has broadened the
scope of the right to annual leave enormously. Aside
from these judgments, we will discuss a few other cases.
Independent contractors
We start our review with an important case which
actually was delivered in December 2017, Conley King
(C-214/16). Mr King worked on a ‘self-employed com-
mission only’ contract. It appears from the facts that
both Mr King and his employer/principal, The Sash
Window Workshop, assumed that the former had no
right to paid annual leave. However, after their long-
lasting contract ended, he did claim payment of untaken
leave. Already iIn the proceedings before the case got to
the ECJ, it was already found that Mr King was a work-
er within the meaning of Directive 2003/88 and thus
was entitled to annual leave (Article 7). As much of the
leave had lapsed – UK law in principle requires leave to
be taken in the same year as it was acquired – the refer-
ring court asked the ECJ how to deal with this. The ECJ
held that Directive 2003/88 precludes national provi-
sions or practices that prevent a worker from carrying
over and, where appropriate, accumulating, until termi-
nation of his employment relationship, paid annual leave
rights not exercised in respect of several consecutive ref-
erence periods because his employer refused to remu-
nerate that leave.
Although the outcome of the case does not seem sur-
prising, it demonstrated that the ECJ monitors any pro-
visions on expiry or lapse of rights to annual leave very
closely. A more practical consequence of the Conley
King judgment is that it may have demonstrated to a
greater audience that independent contractors also may
also be entitled to annual leave. This is no surprise from
a legal perspective – independent contractors can be
workers within the meaning of Directive 2003/88 – but
the message that independent contractors may be enti-
tled to annual leave could be relevant in the debate on
the gig economy and platform work.
Accrual of rights during parental leave
In the Dicu case (C-12/17), the ECJ allowed a Romani-
an provision which excluded parental leave from being
treated as a period of actual work during the reference
period in which a worker accrues his/her annual leave.
This had led a worker taking parental leave to accruing
fewer rights to annual leave. Compared to sick leave and
7. Jan-Pieter Vos is a labour law teacher at Erasmus University in Rotter-
dam, The Netherlands. Luca Ratti is Associate Professor of European
and Comparative Labour Law at Université du Luxembourg.
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maternity leave, parental leave appears to have been
considered a more voluntary form of leave and therefore
does not get the same protection.
6 November judgments
On 6 November 2018, the ECJ delivered what arguably
are the judgments of the year in the Kreuziger case
(C-619/16), joined cases Bauer and Willmeroth
(C-569/16 and C-570/16) and the Max Planck case
(C-684/16). These cases appear to have become land-
mark cases, as the ECJ both introduced a duty for the
employer to enable employees to take their leave (Kreu-
ziger, Max Planck) and enabled a direct appeal to Article
31(2) (right to annual leave) CFREU (Bauer et al. and
Max Planck).
Regarding the first issue, both Kreuziger and Max
Planck concerned workers who had outstanding, untak-
en leave at the moment that their employment contract
had ended. While Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88 ena-
bles the possibility to pay an allowance in lieu in this sit-
uation, it appears that the German (case) law at issue
required that employees had actually requested to take
the leave during their employment, before they would
be entitled to this compensation. As they had not done
requested (enough) leave, their employers refused to
pay such an allowance.
The ECJ held that such an automatic loss of rights is
not allowed under the terms of the Directive. As a weak-
er party in the employment relationship, the employee
must not be dissuaded to from exercising the right to
annual leave, especially when claiming that this right
may have detrimental effects for the employment rela-
tionship. Any practice or omission by an employer that
may potentially deter the worker from taking his or her
right to annual leave is forbidden. In fact, the employer
must ensure that the worker is given the opportunity to
take the paid annual leave, by encouraging him or her,
formally if need be, to do so, while informing him or
her, accurately and in good time so as to ensure that the
leave is still capable of procuring the rest and relaxation
to which it is supposed to contribute. Further, if the
worker does not take the leave, it will be lost at the end
of the reference period or authorised carry-over period,
or upon termination of the employment relationship
where the termination occurs during such a period.
Moreover, the employer must be able to prove that he it
has done so.
These cases take employer obligations a whole lot fur-
ther. Whereas an employer’s primary task was to accom-
modate the employee wanting to take annual leave, the
employer now has an active role and must ensure that
the worker takes the leave. If he the employer does not,
the employee will remain entitled to his outstanding
leave or a corresponding payment at the end of the
employment.
The second and most important aspect of the judgments
was at issue in the cases Bauer et al. and Max Planck.
The problem for private parties is that, in many EU
Member States, it is difficult to enforce their rights if
the national legislation is not compliant with EU legisla-
tion. Private parties cannot directly invoke directives
against each other and have to rely on state liability,
which often is difficult. However, with Bauer et al. and
Max Planck the ECJ circumvented this problem, by
allowing private parties a direct appeal to Article 31(2)
CFREU, forcing national judges to disregard provisions
that are contrary to this Article.
Article 31(2) CFREU reads: “Every worker has the
right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily
and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid
leave.” This Article is even more succinct and less con-
crete than Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, but it seems
that the ECJ applies its case law on Article 7 of Direc-
tive 2003/88 equally to Article 31(2). Moreover, within
the context of the CFREU, the right to annual leave is
even dubbed an essential right of EU law.
A lot can be said about the ECJ’s considerations, but
from a practical point of view it is important to note that
the ECJ acknowledges the direct horizontal effect of the
right to annual leave of Article 31(2). The arguments by
the ECJ recalled supranational sources (namely the
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights
of Workers, the European Social Charter Revisited
(revised) of 1996, and the ILO Convention No 132), to
hold that the right to annual leave is not just an essential
principle of EU social law (Bauer et al., para. 79), but
“mandatory and unconditional in nature” so that Article
31(2) “is sufficient in itself to confer on workers a right
that they may actually rely on in disputes between them
and their employer in a field covered by EU law and
therefore falling within the scope of the Charter” (Bauer
et al., para 85).
Within an employment law context, we already were
already aware of such direct effect in discrimination
cases (e.g., Mangold, C-144/04 and Kücükdeveci,
C-155/07), but this direct effect appeared to stem from
the fact that the principle of non-discrimination on
grounds of age was a general principle of EU law. A few
years ago, a direct effect of Article 27 CFREU was
denied in the case Association de Médiation Sociale
(C-176/12) because that norm is not in itself sufficient
to confer on individuals an individual right which they
may invoke as such. Therefore, Bauer et al. appears to
be the first employment law case, which acknowledges
with such emphasis the direct effect of the CFREU.
As the right to annual leave now has direct effect, we
probably will not be seeing state liability cases on this
field anymore. This has always been a problematic way
for employees who have fallen victim to wrong imple-
mentation of EU legislation, as the Francovich doctrine
offered several ways out for EU Member States. For
example, in 2018 the Danish case which featured in
EELC 2018/10 saw the Government defending success-
fully in a case which concerned the wrong implementa-
tion of the right to annual leave. In 2009, the Pereda
judgment (C-277/08) had rendered Danish provisions
on annual leave and sick leave invalid, and the employee
got sick (and therefore disadvantaged by national legis-
lation) in 2010. The Supreme Court agreed with the
employee that the Danish Government should have
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enacted an amended Holiday Act earlier than in January
2012. However, it considered that 1 January 2011 would
have been a realistic deadline, as a result of which the
employee remained empty-handed.
Holiday pay
In December 2018, the ECJ delivered another interest-
ing judgment. In case C-385/17 (Hein), it had to rule on
the definition of ‘pay’. A collective agreement contained
a definition of holiday pay which resulted in lower pay if
in the reference period no/less work was performed due
to short-time working. As the ECJ has held many times
before, holiday pay must be comparable to regular pay,
as otherwise this would be deemed to be deterring
workers from taking their leave. This case turned out to
be no different: this practice is not compatible with EU
law. However, the ECJ made an interesting remark
(paragraphs 46 and 47): incidental overtime, given its
exceptional and unforeseeable nature does not, in prin-
ciple, form part of holiday pay, but regular overtime
does.
Interestingly, EELC 2018/43 featured a British case –
delivered prior to the Hein judgment – in which the
Employment Appeal Tribunal held that both non-guar-
anteed and voluntary overtime should be taken into
account when calculating holiday pay. To that end, it
referred to EU case law to that date (Williams – v – Brit-
ish Airways, C-155/10). Had the Hein judgment been
delivered earlier, the outcome would probably have
been different.
Concluding remarks
As we said at the start of this review: 2018 has been a
very important year for the right to annual leave. In par-
ticular the cases Conley King and the ‘6 November judg-
ments’ have strengthened the right to annual leave. It
now appears to have an even stronger position in EU
law, firmly protected by Article 31(2) CFREU having a
direct horizontal effect. The days that when the right to




Four judgments about collective dismissals were
reviewed during 2018 in EELC: two of them are judg-
ments of the ECJ and two judgments of national
Supreme Courts.
Collective redundancies and protection of female
employees during pregnancy
The ECJ clarified the right to the protection from ter-
mination of employment of pregnant workers under
Article 10 of Directive 92/85 (Pregnant Workers Direc-
tive) in the case of collective redundancies covered by
8. Daiva Petrylaitė is a professor in Labour Law at Vilnius University.
Directive 98/59 (Collective Redundancy Directive) in
the Porras Guisado judgment (C-103/16).
Quoting the Advocate General (point 53 of the Opin-
ion), the ECJ stated that, when a pregnant worker (or a
worker who has recently given birth or is breastfeeding)
is dismissed within the context of a collective redundan-
cy procedure, she belongs both to the group of workers
protected under Directive 92/85 and to the group of
workers protected under Directive 98/59; on that basis,
she should benefit, at the same time, from the rights
provided for by both of those Directives. With referen-
ces to its previous judgments, the ECJ held that when
the dismissal decision is taken for reasons essentially
connected with the worker’s pregnancy, it is incompati-
ble with the prohibition on dismissal laid down in Arti-
cle 10 of the Pregnant Workers Directive; by contrast, a
dismissal decision taken during the period from the
beginning of pregnancy to the end of the maternity
leave for reasons unconnected with the worker’s preg-
nancy would not be contrary to Article 10 of Directive
92/85 (Danosa, C-232/09). Meanwhile, according to the
Court, Article 1(1)(a) of the Collective Redundancy
Directive states that ‘collective redundancies’ refers to
dismissals effected by an employer for one or more
reasons not related to the individual workers concerned,
provided that certain conditions concerning numbers
and periods of time are satisfied (Rodríguez Mayor and
Others, C-323/08). The Court found that a reason or
reasons, not related to the individual workers con-
cerned, for making the collective redundancies within
the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 98/59 fall with-
in the exceptional cases not related to the condition of
pregnant workers within the meaning of Article 10(1) of
Directive 92/85. On that basis, the Court concluded
that Article 10(1) of Directive 92/85 must be interpre-
ted as not precluding national legislation which permits
the dismissal of a pregnant worker because of a collec-
tive redundancy within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a) of
Directive 98/59.
This judgment of the Court is significant, first of all in
its interpretation of the scope of the female workers’
protection against termination from employment
enshrined in the Pregnant Workers Directive. Secondly,
the reasons that force the employer to carry out collec-
tive redundancies according to the Collective Redun-
dancy Directive, at the same time, are recognised as
legitimate and sufficient to apply such redundancy pro-
cedures, inter alia, to pregnant workers.
Definition of ‘undertaking controlling the
employer’ in case of collective redundancies
The Court in the judgment Miriam Bichat and Others
(joined cases C-61/17, C-62/17 and C-72/17) clarified
Article 2(4) of Directive 98/59 (Collective Redundancy
Directive) as far as it states that the decision regarding
collective redundancies is being taken by an ‘undertaking
controlling the employer’. According to the Court, in
interpreting the origins and the objective of the first
subparagraph of Article 2(4) of Directive 98/59, the
term ‘undertaking controlling the employer’ covers all
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undertakings which, by virtue of belonging to the same
group or having a shareholding that gives it the majority
of votes in the general meeting and/or the decision-
making bodies within the employer, are able to require
the latter to adopt a decision contemplating or planning
for collective redundancies. In addition, the Court sta-
ted that a simple contractual relationship, in so far as
such a relationship does not allow an undertaking to
exercise a decisive influence on dismissal decisions taken
by the employer, cannot be considered sufficient to
establish a situation of control within the meaning of the
first subparagraph of Article 2(4) of Directive 98/59.
The resuming Court clarified that the first subpara-
graph of Article 2(4) of Directive 98/59 must be inter-
preted as meaning that the term ‘undertaking controlling
the employer’ covers all undertakings linked to that
employer by shareholdings in the latter or by other links
in law which allow it to exercise decisive influence in the
employer’s decision-making bodies and compel it to
contemplate or to plan for collective redundancies.
In this judgment, the Court gave a significant explana-
tion concerning the term ‘undertaking controlling the
employer’, first of all, taking into account that this term
doesn’t refer to the national law, it should be interpreted
in the same way throughout the European Union; sec-
ondly, the Court referring to its previous judgments
clarified that the term ‘control’ refers to a situation in
which an undertaking may adopt a strategic or commer-
cial decision compelling the employer to contemplate or
to plan for collective redundancies. On this basis, the
Court stated that the term ‘undertaking controlling the
employer’ in the context of the Directive, should be
applied in a narrower sense, i.e. as an undertaking whose
influence is ensured through shareholdings and voting
rights but not based on a contractual or de facto influ-
ence.
The Austrian Supreme Court judgments in
collective redundancy cases
Regarding national precedents, only two cases, both
Austrian, were reviewed in 2018. In the first judgment
of the Austrian Supreme Court (EELC 2018/15) the
question of applicable law was raised (the dispute arose
as to whether the law of Austria or Germany applied),
however the Court did not interpret or define the issues
related to collective redundancies.
In another judgment (EELC 2018/38) the Austrian
Supreme Court held that the employer must notify the
Employment Service when it is contemplating collective
redundancies, even if they are carried out by mutual
agreement. The duty of notification is triggered if the
employer proposes a mutual termination agreement to a
relevant number of employees, provided the offer is
binding and can be accepted by the employees within
30 days. If the employer fails to notify the Employment
Service, any subsequent redundancies (or mutual termi-
nations of employment occurring on the employer’s ini-
tiative) are void, even if effected after 30 days.
Thus, the Court noted that collective redundancies
should not be limited to cases where employment con-
tracts are terminated at the initiative of the employer
(for economic and other reasons not related to the
employee), but also the termination of the employment
contract by mutual agreement if it is initiated by the
employer and the circumstances indicate that the initia-
tive was caused for the same reasons as other collective
redundancies during the fixed period.
Gig economy in 2018
Andrej Poruban9
In recent years, digital technologies have quickly
become a focal point for discussions about the future of
the traditional world of work. One of the major transfor-
mations has been the emergence of the so-called ‘gig
economy’ under which the demand and supply of work-
ing activities is matched via mobile applications. These
online platforms have diverse origins and encompass
multiple services such as the ride-hailing system, food
delivery, cleaning, home repairs and other skilled or
routine work. The growth of this new phenomena raises
new questions concerning misclassification of employ-
ment relationships.
In 2018, litigation in cases of worker/employee or self-
employed contractors has flourished throughout Europe
with different outcomes: e.g. in Spain - Juzgado de lo
Social núm. 11 de Barcelona, 29 May 2018, Juzgado de
lo Social núm. 6 de Valencia, 1 June 2018, Juzgado de lo
Social núm. 39 de Madrid, 3 September 2018; Italy -
Tribunale Ordinario di Torino, 7 May 2018 (neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeal didn’t uphold the decision,
11 January 2019), Tribunale di Milano, 10 September
2018; France - Cour de cassation, 28 November 2018.
One of the high profile cases was also featured in EELC
2018/9 and focused on the most visible example of the
gig economy. In Uber B.V. & Others – v – Aslam &
Others the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) dealt
with the practical realities of the relationship between
Uber and its associated companies and their drivers.
The group of former London drivers brought claims for
the national minimum wage and paid annual leave.
These entitlements extend to every ‘worker’. The
‘worker’ is an intermediate category in UK law in
between an ‘employee’, who is obliged to work for an
employer when required in accordance with her/his
contract, and has the greatest level of employment pro-
tection and an ‘independent contractor’, who works
autonomously. In the Employment Tribunal the judge
found that they were ‘workers’, rather than self-
employed contractors, broadly as they were not in con-
trol of setting fares and were subject to various forms of
control through the eponymous software app. That
decision was upheld by the EAT. In the meantime, on
9. Andrej Poruban is an Assistant professor at the Faculty of Law of
Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia.
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19 December 2018, the Court of Appeal rejected Uber’s
appeal (Uber B.V. & Ors – v – Aslam & Ors [2018]
EWCA Civ 2748) and held that the original Employ-
ment Tribunal decision was correct – the claimants were
entitled to the rights which come with worker status.
The majority of the Court of Appeal clarified two piv-
otal issues. The drivers did not have a contract with
their passengers and they could be considered to be
working for Uber when they logged onto the app in
their territory in order to be ready and willing to accept
any trips offered. It is worth nothing that Uber gained
some judicial support. One judge disagreed and raise
some compelling points in favour of Uber’s arguments.
In a dissenting opinion, he found that the drivers were
independent contractors and argued that the written
terms in place are perfectly explicit and reflected that
drivers provide their services to the passengers as prin-
cipals, with Uber’s role being that of intermediary. In
this context, it’s not surprising that the Court of Appeal
has given Uber permission to appeal to the Supreme
Court.
The gig economy was also questioned by the ECJ in a
landmark judgment Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi – v
– Uber Systems Spain SL (C-434/15). The Spanish
commercial court referred questions for a preliminary
ruling on whether services provided by Uber are regar-
ded as transport services, information society services or
a combination of both. The ECJ recognised that the
activity of the platform is not limited to a mere electron-
ic intermediation and qualified Uber as a service in the
field of transport. The company has created a supply of
urban transport services itself and has organised it by
selecting the drivers, providing an application which is
indispensable for both the drivers and people who wish
to make a journey and regulating some key aspects of
their offer. The ECJ also noted that Uber exercises a
certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the driv-
ers and their conduct which can, in some circumstances,
result in them being excluded. Of course, this ruling
remains silent about the characterisation of the relation-
ship between platform/driver/passenger and leaves
such effort to domestic legislation and case law. Howev-
er, it may have a broader impact from a labour law per-
spective because the ECJ dealt with the same argumen-
tation of Uber which claim to be solely an intermediary
and de facto deny the role and responsibilities of an
employer.
Despite developments in 2018 there is no clear-cut
answer to the question of the employment qualification
within the various platforms related to the gig economy
and therefore case-by-case analysis is still required. In
this context is therefore interesting to see the initial
reactions of International Labour Organization. The
report on the Future of Work published on January
2019 recommends to develop an international govern-
ance system for crowdworking websites and app-medi-
ated work that sets and requires platforms to respect
minimum rights and protections and looks to the ILO
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 as a model.
Fundamental rights: privacy and
freedom of expression
Prof. Stein Evju10
Privacy and work intersect in many different ways.
While private life and privacy, not necessarily one and
the same, enjoy protection on the one hand they may, on
the other hand, be impacted on by obligations vested in
the employment relationship. The borderline between
right and wrong is a multifarious challenge, illustrated
in different ways by three cases reported in 2018,
brought together here under the headline ‘fundamental
rights’.
Notwithstanding ECJ case law, most recently last year’s
judgment in Matzak (C-518/15), the distinction
between standby duty and on-call availability is not clear
cut in practice. The Portuguese Court of Appeal judg-
ment (EELC 2018/33) and the comments triggered by
it illustrate the point, at the same time highlighting a
particular aspect of privacy rights. If a worker on stand-
by or on call – terminology is not decisive – is free to
move about and stay wherever s/he likes, the time thus
spent as a rule is not deemed working time; it is only
time actually spent working when called upon that is
regarded as such. Restrictions on the worker’s freedom
in time or space may lead to a different conclusion. The
intensity of measures involved in being available may do
the same. Judging from comments made on the Portu-
guese decision the working time issue is at the outset
considered differently in different jurisdictions. That
may be the case also where a worker is required to carry
an active GPS tracker outside of working hours for the
purpose of availability. This may in itself or, depending
on an individual balancing of interests, amount to a vio-
lation of GDPR-based privacy protection and, as the
case may be, of the right to privacy under Article 8
ECHR.
So-called social media is fertile ground for conflictual
issues in the interface between private life, privacy
rights and work-related obligations. Posts or mere ‘likes’
on internet platforms may be seen as offensive, inconsis-
tent with and thus harmful to the employer’s values and
reputation, as exemplified by the Belgian judgment –
EELC 2018/4 – upholding dismissal for serious mis-
conduct on grounds of ‘liking’ a website associated with
racist activity. Cases of this kind immediately engages
freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10
ECHR. Balancing this freedom with other freedom
rights and conflicting interests is no mean task. The best
to be said is that it requires comprehensive and careful
consideration in the individual case, keeping in mind
10. Stein Evju is a professor emeritus at the Department of Private law,
University of Oslo.
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that dismissal – as the ECtHR has put it (e.g. in
Ognevenko, 44873/09, paragraph 83) – is the most
severe disciplinary sanction or penalty. Proportionality
considerations beg to play an essential part.
Internet activities during working hours is another arena
of potential conflict. An employer may legitimately
restrict or prohibit employees’ use of workplace IT
resources during working hours. If detected, transgres-
sions may lead to sanctions, similarly engaging a balanc-
ing of interests. The German Bundesarbeitsgericht
(BAG) judgment (EELC 2018/5) is concerned with a
prior stage, so to say, which likewise involves balancing
of interests. Monitoring by the employer of employees’
use of IT resources is permissible, but up to a point.
Privacy rights under Article 8 ECHR and GDPR-rela-
ted issues are involved. Whether information obtained
through unlawful monitoring or surveillance may be
used in evidence is in principle another matter. The
BAG judgment and comments from other jurisdictions
demonstrate that there is no unanimous or unambiguous
answer to this. Some exclude unlawfully gathered evi-
dence from use in court, whereas others do not. The
landmark decision by the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) in
Bărbulescu (no. 61496/08) elaborates on considerations
relevant to assessments of conformity or violation of
Article 8 ECHR. However, it does not provide a
straightforward answer to whether unlawfully gathered
evidence may be used in court. Arguably, an answer in
the negative may be inferred by implication. It is a point




There were merely two judgments in the field of collec-
tive labour law that featured in EELC 2018, both from
domestic courts. Collective agreements are recognised as
an important means of regulation over a wide range of
issues in EU law. Yet there is no definition or autono-
mous concept of ‘collective agreement’ in EU legislation
or case law. This is deferred to national law, and the
concept differs significantly across jurisdictions. The
Danish Supreme Court decision (EELC 2018/22) is a
case in point.
Formalities are few and far between when it comes to
concluding a collective agreement between parties in
Danish law, be that at national or at local level. The
same is true for the other Scandinavian countries, Nor-
way and Sweden. If collective bargaining and subse-
quent mediation fail to arrive at a settlement, as a rule
recourse is taken to collective action. If the parties still
do not reach a compromise on a renewed agreement,
state intervention of some form is potentially a means to
break the impasse. As opposed to Sweden, in Denmark
11. Stein Evju is a professor emeritus at the Department of Private law,
University of Oslo.
and Norway there is a certain practice in this regard,
however in different forms.
In Denmark, the prevailing practice, if state interven-
tion is deemed necessary, is to adopt an ad hoc act by the
Folketinget (National Assembly) on renewal of the col-
lective agreement at issue, possibly with amendments
drawn from preceding mediation proposals. The ‘inter-
vention act’ sets a period of validity corresponding to
that which would apply had the parties them-
selves arrived at an agreement. The objective of an
‘intervention act’ is indeed to establish a mutually bind-
ing regulation for the parties in the form of a collective
agreement with all legal effects otherwise attributed to
voluntary agreements. Similarly, in Norway there is no
permanent legislation empowering the Government or a
Minister to intervene. If collective action is seen to per-
sist with no prospect of reaching a settlement, the
Stortinget  (National Assembly) may adopt an ad hoc act,
not itself imposing a collective agreement but referring
the dispute for settlement by an independent arbitration
body, the National Wages Board. Pursuant to standing
legislation, the Board’s decisions have the same legal
effect as a collective agreement, that is, in law they are
collective agreements in their own right.
State intervention of this kind may be subject to criti-
cism by ILO supervisory bodies, under ILO Conven-
tion No. 87, or by the European Committee of Social
Rights pursuant to Article 6(4) of the European Social
Charter (revised), which has been the case for both
countries a number of times. However, it is significant
to note that intervention is not per se a violation. This
depends on an assessment of the individual case of
intervention in pursuance of the ILO bodies’ doctrine
on ‘essential services’ etc. or the European Social Char-
ter Article G exception clause, as demonstrated in case
law of the supervisory bodies.
It must be emphasised, also, that such forms of ad hoc
intervention are fundamentally different from adopting
new legislation or executive measures of a general kind.
Collective agreements in the Scandinavian context are
binding only on the parties to the agreement and their
members concerned. They have no erga omnes effect,
and no mechanisms of extension obtain.
Whether something is categorised in law as a collective
agreement is self-evidently fundamentally important in
many regards. In EU law this includes the possible
implementation of, or derogation from, EU legislation.
The latter is demonstrated by the Danish Supreme
Court case, where the issue was whether the outcome of
the intervention act could be deemed a ‘collective agree-
ment’ within the meaning of Article 18 of the Working
Time Directive (2003/88/EC). It is readily understand-
able that the Danish courts chose not to refer ques-
tions on this to the ECJ, which would run a risk of
interference with embedded industrial relations. More
generally, considering the widely differing concepts of
collective bargaining and collective agreements across
Member States it might open a Pandora’s Box with
incalculable consequences.
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What a collective agreement can lawfully stipulate, once
it obtains, is a different matter. The freedom of collec-
tive agreement parties is constrained by domestic and
EU law. This is trite. So is its being commonplace that
collective agreements lend themselves to interpretation.
Methods of interpretation may differ, but it is common
ground that courts construing collective agreement pro-
visions should take due account of relevant legislation,
to avoid conflicting outcomes as far as possible. Both
aspects are illustrated by the German case (EELC
2017/45), in which the Court, seemingly, considered
ECJ case law and German legislation implementing the
Part Time Workers Directive (97/81/EC) arriving at a
conclusion on what at the outset was an interpretation
issue.
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